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Abstract 
 
Dividend policy is one of the most complex topics of finance and has a huge impact on the 
investment and financing decisions of a company. In academic literature, the relationship 
between Dividend Policy, Ownership Structure and Debt financing is still not clear. The aim 
of this dissertation is to study how ownership structure and Debt financing relates to firm’s 
Dividend Policy in Portugal.  
The analysis is performed on a panel data set, which includes a sample of 25 firms listed on 
Euronext Lisbon in the period from 2007 to 2016. The recent studies performed for 
Portuguese firms only focus on the impact of dividend policy on firms’ value and on several 
determinants of dividend policy (growth, leverage, profitability, size, tax, among others). This 
dissertation will allow studying the implications of the agency theory and corporate 
governance on dividend policy of Portuguese firms and, in particular, in firms with different 
levels of debt.  
Our results support a U-shaped relationship between managerial ownership and dividends 
payments in Portuguese firms. We also find that the nature of the relationship between 
managerial ownership and dividends differ across firms with different levels of debt. The 
results of the study are consistent with the agency theory framework.  
 
Keywords: dividend policy, ownership structure, debt financing, agency theory, corporate 
governance 
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1. Introduction 
The separation between ownership and control creates conflicts of interests in a firm  (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976). The managers of the company can pursue their own interests and 
undermine the interests of the shareholders. A good corporate governance is relevant to 
ensure a Dividend Policy that benefits both managers and shareholders’ interests. Dividends, 
debt issuance and managerial ownership have been discussed, by several authors, as 
disciplining mechanisms which mitigate the corporate governance problem (Farinha, 2003a). 
Therefore, the Dividend Policy of a company should be related to the ownership structure 
and the level of debt.  
The aim of the dissertation is to study the relationship between ownership structure, debt 
financing and the Dividend Policy of companies in Portugal. In this study, the research 
questions are the following: 
a) What is the relation between managerial ownership and dividends across Portuguese 
firms and, in particular, in firms with different levels of debt. 
b) What is the impact of corporate governance on Portuguese firms’ dividend policy. 
For this study, a sample of 25 firms listed on Euronext Lisbon will be used. Since in Portugal 
there is a reduced number of firms that pays dividends to shareholders, the analysis will 
comprise a period of 10 years, from 2007 to 2016. Financial companies and sports clubs will 
be excluded from the sample. 
The motivation of this research arises from the importance of this topic in the field of 
Finance, and its implications. Dividend Policy has a huge impact not only on firms but also 
in the whole economy. For instance, when a company changes its dividend policy, it affects 
the perception of the company that investors and the financial markets have. It is considered 
a sign about the performance of the company to outside investors.  
Furthermore, the study of dividend policy for Portuguese companies from the point of view 
of corporate governance is quite an interesting and challenging analysis. In fact, this 
dissertation will certainly contribute to the academic literature since there are no recent 
studies comparing the dividend policy of Portuguese firms against corporate governance and 
agency theory. Most of the current studies conducted in Portugal focus on the impact of 
dividend policy on firm’s value and on several determinants of dividend policy (growth, 
leverage, profitability, size, tax, among others), existing a literature gap on the point of view 
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of corporate governance/agency theory for Portuguese firms. In addition, the study of the 
relationship between corporate governance and dividend policy in Portugal may complement 
recently performed studies about the subject in other regions. This analysis is interesting not 
only for researchers, but also for all the companies involved and all its stakeholders, mainly 
because of contradictory opinions and theories about dividend policies and its (ir)relevance. 
The methodology and model that will be used will be based on the approach of Florackis et 
al. (2015). A panel data analysis will be performed. We expect to get a better understanding 
of the relation between ownership structure, dividends and debt in reducing agency costs of 
free cash flow in Portugal. 
This dissertation will be structured in 5 sections. In the Section 2, we will introduce some 
relevant definitions and literature review about the topic. In addition, we will present a critical 
analysis and a description of the corporate governance system in Portugal and its implications 
on Portuguese firms’ Dividend Policy. In Section 3, we will describe the methodology, data 
and variables used in the analysis. In Section 4, we will present and discuss the main results 
for the sample and sub-samples and in the last section we will present the conclusion. 
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2. Literature Review  
In this section, we will discuss some important definitions on the literature review about the 
topic. First, we present the relevant definitions of Corporate Governance and the agency 
problem, and the corporate governance mechanisms to reduce agency risks, namely 
Dividend Policy, Ownership and Debt financing. In addition, we will present some theories 
discussed in academic literature about corporate dividends. Then, we will discuss the main 
results of similar studies and present our critical view of the existing literature. 
 
2.1  Corporate Governance and the Agency Problem 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), the agency problem results from the separation 
between ownership and management. The authors define the agency relationship as a 
contract under which one part (the principal, the owner) engages another part (the agent, the 
manager) to perform some service on its behalf. Hence, the principal will delegate some 
decision-making authority to the agent. The principal hires the agent mainly due to his 
expertise and ability to perform the job and the principal’s lack of time. Nevertheless, the 
interests of each are not necessarily the same, which gives origin to several conflicts, costs or 
losses of value. Considering that individuals are rational, they want to maximize their utility 
and value.  
The major agency conflict is reflected on the theory of the free cash flow of Jensen and 
Meckling (1976). These agency problems arise from the impossibility of perfectly contracting 
for every possible action of the agent whose decisions affect both his own and the principal’s 
welfare. The principal will not maximise his value or utility if the available free cash flow 
from operations are used discretionally by managers, following a dividend policy in favour 
of retention of earnings, under the pretext of financing new investment opportunities. The 
problem can lead to two different scenarios: overinvestment in line with the manager 
overblown ambition or, in contrast, to perquisite consumption and underinvestment. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) define corporate governance as a set of internal and external 
mechanisms, from incentive and control, aimed at minimizing the agency costs. Corporate 
governance mechanisms are destined to solve or mitigate potential conflicts of interest 
among stakeholders of the company (shareholders, creditors, managers, employees, 
customers, suppliers and the State). According to the authors, with Corporate Governance 
4 
 
mechanisms, shareholders are able to control the managers’ performance reducing the 
probabilities of inappropriate behaviour and actions. Hence, with higher monitoring of the 
directors’ actions, the agency problem should be reduced and the company performance 
should increase. Accordingly, in companies a way to mitigate and reduce those agency 
conflicts is through the implementation of good Corporate Governance mechanisms. 
In the academic literature, different authors have discussed several mechanisms to solve the 
agency conflict between managers and shareholders (Farinha, 2003a). Particularly, the 
dividend payments, debt issuance and managerial ownership have been identified as 
corporate governance mechanisms to reduce the agency conflicts.  
Nonetheless, currently there are still no robust conclusions about the relationship between 
these mechanisms and whether they work in substitute/complementary ways (Florackis et 
al., 2015). 
 
 
2.2   Corporate Governance mechanisms 
2.2.1 Dividend Policy 
Dividend policy decisions have huge impact on the available free cash flow of the firms as 
well as in the investment and financing strategies. Over the past few years, dividends have 
been subject to an extensive research. Despite all the research on the field, there is no 
generally accepted model or theory describing the dividend policy behaviour of firms. In fact, 
the empirical findings are often difficult to interpret or inconsistent with the theories and 
that is why it can be referred to as a “puzzle” (Black, 1976). The explanations for the dividend 
policy behaviour are several and include tax effects theory, signalling theory, agency theory 
among others. 
Dividend policy is a financial decision faced by the management, on what proportion of the 
company’s earnings should be paid out to shareholders. The managers must decide whether 
the company retains the profits and reinvests in new investment opportunities or pays out 
the earnings to the owners of the firm in the form of dividends. In the decision on how 
much cash to distribute to shareholders, the managers should bear in mind the maximization 
of the shareholders’ value.  
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Moreover, in general, there is a difference between the information that managers and 
shareholders hold. The managers, as insiders of the company, have more information about 
the firm’s cash flow than the outsiders, that have limited access to information about it. 
Knowing this, due to asymmetry of information between insiders (managers) and outsiders 
(shareholders), there will always be conflict of interests (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Nevertheless, these problems of asymmetric information become less 
important if the ownership of the company is more concentrated. 
With respect to the agency theory, there are reasons why dividends will lower agency costs 
in a firm. According to the theory of the free cash flow, dividends will lower the free cash 
flow available. Too much free cash flow could harm the company, since it gives the manager 
an opportunity to make investments which are not in line with the interests of the 
shareholders (Jensen, 1986).  
A solution to reduce agency problems is to pay a high proportion of earnings as dividends 
to the shareholders. Dividends represent cash income to shareholders and at some extent, 
signal them about the success of the firm they have invested. The distribution of dividends 
contributes to the increase of the share price of the company and, thus, to the increase of 
shareholder wealth.  
From another point of view, dividends will lower agency costs because it will force managers 
to raise money on the equity market. When this happens, the debtholders, which are willing 
to lend the money, will investigate the firm and the monitoring actions will increase. This 
increased monitoring will lead to less agency costs (Easterbrook, 1984). From this point of 
view, dividend payments have been considered as a “bonding” mechanism to reduce the 
agency problems between managers and shareholders. The implicit explanation is that when 
a firm pays dividends, it is submitted to monitoring by the equity markets (Easterbrook, 
1984; Jensen, 1986; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Rozeff, 1982).  
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2.2.2  Ownership structure 
The ownership structure of a firm is of major importance in corporate governance and it is 
the relative amount of ownership claims held by insiders (management) and outsiders 
(investors with no direct role in the management of the firm). It has impact on the managers’ 
incentives and, thereby the financial performance of companies and the wealth of 
shareholders.  
As previously mentioned, several conflicts of interests are generated due to the separation 
between ownership and control. Given the governance issues arising from this separation of 
power, it is important to understand the ability to align managerial and shareholder interests.  
The managers who own equity in the firm will act as owners and reduce the degree of 
expropriation from outside investors (alignment effect). Agency costs are lower in firms with 
high managerial ownership stakes because of better alignment of shareholder and managerial 
control (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
In contrast, as managerial ownership increases to very high levels, managers may not exert 
sufficient effort, they may collect private benefits and entrench themselves at the expense of 
external shareholders (Farinha, 2003b; Florackis et al., 2015). This behaviour is known as the 
entrenchment effect. 
According to Jensen (1986), the relation of dividends and managerial ownership as 
substitutes mechanisms for reducing the discretionary resources under managers’ control 
should be negative. The author developed a life-cycle model for the firm’s optimal dividend 
policy focusing on the trade-off between the benefits of retained earnings and the agency 
costs.  
Against this view, some authors have argued that the relation between dividends and insider 
ownership would turn positive above a certain level of ownership due to the entrenchment 
effect. The basis of this explanation is that entrenched managers, at high ownership levels, 
do not see dividends and debt as substitute mechanisms. As ownership levels increase, they 
prefer dividends since they increase their own and the other shareholders’ welfare. Therefore, 
this explanation takes a U-shaped dividend–ownership relation, including both the alignment 
and entrenchment effects (Farinha, 2003b). Hence, there is evidence of a statically significant 
non-linearity relation of ownership structure with debt and dividends (Farinha, 2003b; 
Florackis et al., 2009).  
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With respect to the relation between debt and managerial ownership, the empirical evidence 
is not clear. While some authors defend a positive relationship based on managerial 
preferences to maintain their control within the company, avoiding the agency costs of 
external equity (Florackis et al., 2009), others support a negative relationship between debt 
and insider ownership (Friend & Lang, 1988). Despite those arguments, it is also possible to 
find evidence of a non-linear relation between debt and managerial ownership (Florackis et 
al., 2009). 
In addition, agency costs are lower in firms with large-block shareholders, which are better 
able to monitor managerial activities (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). Large-block shareholders, 
generally institutional investors, are investors that hold at least 5 per cent of equity ownership 
within a firm. A higher level of ownership concentration or more large-block shareholders 
suggest a stronger monitoring power from investors over a firm’s managerial decisions 
because of their incentives. On the other hand, firms with a low level of ownership 
concentration (diffused ownership) might indicate weaker governance power because 
investors with less ownership interests have little incentive to pay attention to the strategic 
decisions of the firm and thus, are less motivated to closely monitor and discipline 
management. In this case, small shareholders will act as free-riders (Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
In fact, the majority of shareholders have stocks in a variety of firms. This means that the 
risk that affects a particular firm will not be a threat to their total portfolio. However, in the 
manager perspective, they usually have a large stake in the firm they work. For instance, not 
only they might own stocks and options to purchase additional stock, they might also have 
their salary tied to the performance of the company’s share price in financial markets. The 
personal incentives of managers can have impact on the dividend policy (Lambert et al., 
1989). Thus, the good performance of the company really matters to the managers.  
However, following the entrenchment hypotheses, managers holding a considerable stake in 
the company and having enough voting power, will ensure their position and be, at some 
extent, protected against a takeover threat or the managerial labour market (Fama & Jensen, 
1983; Farinha, 2003b).  
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2.2.3  Debt financing 
When a company needs cash, it can obtain financing through equity, debt or both. Equity 
represents an ownership stake in the company, giving the shareholder a claim on future 
earnings. The lenders are the investors that provide the company with debt financing. In 
return for lending the money, they become creditors and receive a promise that the principal 
and the interest on the debt will be repaid. In fact, in an eventual bankruptcy situation, the 
first in line to receive the money are the debtholders, while the last ones are the equity 
holders. Debtholders have the option to take the firm into bankruptcy if management default 
on their debt obligations. Because of this monitoring device, debt financing is argued to be 
a mechanism to reduce agency costs (Stulz, 1990). 
Several authors discuss the possible solutions for agency problems and one of the solutions 
is to use more debt financing. The use of Debt reduces the total equity financing and, 
consequently, the agency conflicts.  
Debt financing can be difficult to obtain and risky for the company. Myers and Majluf (1984) 
say that information asymmetry between inside and outside investors can generate external 
financing constraints and raise the cost of external financing. The main advantage of debt 
financing over equity, besides the advantage of the interest on debt being tax deductible, is 
that the lender has no control over the running of the company. The decision to use debt or 
equity is taken by the manager and depends on the long-term goals of the company. Hence, 
dividends and debt interest payment will reduce the free cash flow available to be squandered 
away by managers (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Nevertheless, dividend payments will end up forcing managers to get financing to invest in 
future investment projects externally. Consequently, to issue new equity in the primary 
markets, a firm should provide relevant information to outside investors and be submitted 
on detailed monitoring by outsiders (Easterbrook, 1984). Once again, the monitoring role of 
outsiders prove to decrease the agency problem. 
Rozeff (1982) argues that firms may have an optimal dividend policy, explained by a trade-
off between the costs of raising external capital and the benefit of reduced agency costs. It is 
a fact that paying dividends comes always at some cost. When a company pays dividends, 
there is less liquidity available for investments. Therefore, the firm has to go to capital 
markets to raise money and support the associated transaction costs. That is why for the 
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author, the amount of dividend paid is a trade-off between the transaction costs and the 
benefits of paying dividends and, consequently, the reduced agency costs. 
Easterbrook (1984) observes that firms pay dividends and raise capital simultaneously. In his 
perspective, increasing dividends raises the probability that additional capital will have to be 
raised from external financing on a periodic basis, and consequently, the firm will be subject 
to monitoring by specialists in capital markets.  
Another argument for leverage as a monitoring mechanism is that firms with high financial 
leverage and financial risk tend to avoid paying high dividends, so they can accommodate 
the risk associated with the use of debt financing. In addition, leverage may impact dividend 
policy due to debt covenants and related restrictions that may be imposed by debtholders 
(Farinha, 2003b).  
All things considered, dividends, debt issuance and managerial ownership have been 
discussed as disciplining mechanisms in providing a solution for the corporate governance 
problem (Farinha, 2003a). The proposed mechanisms aim to control the actions of the 
managers in an attempt to align their own interests with those of shareholders.  
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2.3   Main theories in the View of Dividend Policy 
In financial theory, there is a great number of models based on dividend policy. To begin 
with, Miller and Modigliani (1961) irrelevance theorem states that paying dividends is 
irrelevant and, given the investment decision of a firm, the dividend payout ratio does not 
affect shareholders' wealth. They argued that the value of the firm depends only on its 
investment policy and its earnings. The irrelevance theorem assumes a world where there is 
symmetric information, complete contracting possibilities, complete markets, no taxes and 
no transaction costs. However, companies keep paying high amounts of dividends to their 
shareholders. For this reason, despite Miller and Modigliani (1961) models, the academics 
continue to find many flaws in the irrelevance theory and still realize the importance of 
dividends in making investment and financing decisions. 
An appropriate understanding of dividend policy is critical for many areas in Finance such 
as asset pricing, capital structure, mergers and acquisitions, and capital budgeting (Allen & 
Michaely, 1995).  In general, the consensus is that there is no single explanation for Dividend 
Policy behavior.  
 
2.3.1  The pecking order theory 
Besides the agency theory, there are other theories that explain corporate dividend policy and 
its relationship with managerial ownership and debt. The pecking order theory by Myers and 
Majluf (1984) shows that firms rank their sources of financing. First, they raise internal 
financing, then they issue external debt and, finally, they issue equity. This ranking suggests 
a positive relationship between debt and dividends. In fact, when firms increase the dividend 
pay-out, they reduce the available free cash flow (internal financing). Consequently, the firms 
increase the need for raising external debt in order to maintain an optimal capital structure 
(Aggarwal & Kyaw, 2010). This positive relationship between debt and dividends is 
contradictory to the view of Jensen (1986), previously described. 
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2.3.2  Signalling theory 
From another perspective, companies also pay dividends for signalling purposes. The 
signalling theory states that when a firm is optimistic about the future, it will pay more 
dividends to signal this optimism to its shareholders (Lintner, 1956). Dividends appear to 
display information about companies. An unexpected change in the dividend policy is 
regarded as a sign of how the managers view the future prospects of the firm. An unusually 
large increase in the dividends is often considered to indicate an optimistic view about future 
profitability. On the other hand, a declining dividend behaviour often signals some 
pessimism. The signalling model by Miller and Rock (1985) assumes that dividend payments 
disclose private information to the market, considering asymmetric information between 
managers and shareholders. 
 
2.3.3  Clientele effect 
The clientele effect theory takes into account imperfections in the capital markets such as 
taxes, transaction costs, limited amount of capital, different interest rates, asymmetric 
information, supporting a completely different world from the one suggested by Miller and 
Modigliani (1961). According to this, shareholders will be faced with costs every time the 
Dividend Policy of the company changes. Therefore, wealth maximization may not be the 
only desire for shareholders. They may prefer a stable flow of dividends to match their 
desired consumption pattern and to counter the extra costs. Accordingly, the clientele effect 
has some important implications for companies. First, it suggests that companies get 
investors due to its dividend policy decisions and, second, it highlights the companies’ 
difficulties in changing an established dividend policy, even if it is necessary.  
Management may also be also reluctant to change the established dividend policy because if 
they increase dividend payments, they are left with less cash flows to finance new projects 
and the only alternative is to get external financing, which is even more costly. Due to this 
fact, companies tend to prefer stable dividend policies in order to incur in lesser costs 
(Scholz, 1992). 
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2.4  Similar studies 
The present study aims to analyse the relationship between managerial ownership and debt 
financing on dividend policy in Portugal. Recent studies explore this relationship with 
different approaches in markets such as the UK and US market (Farinha, 2003b; Florackis 
et al., 2015; Jensen et al., 1992). However, there are no similar studies applied to the 
Portuguese market. 
Crutchley and Hansen (1989) performed a cross-sectional analysis of dividend policy, 
examining managers’ ownership and leverage for 603 industrial firms on the period between 
1981-1985. The results are consistent with dividend policy acting as a corporate monitoring 
mechanism and with a substitution effect between levels of the three policies, taking 
advantage of the benefit-cost trade-off to reduce agency costs. They support the equilibrium 
condition of the Jensen and Meckling (1976) model. 
Jensen et al. (1992) studied the determinants of cross-sectional differences in insider 
ownership, debt and dividend policies at two points in time 1982 and 1987. The authors 
claim that these policies are related not only directly, but also indirectly, through their 
relationship with operating characteristics of firms. So, they examine the determinants of the 
three policy choices applying a three stage least squares to a system of equations that includes 
one equation for each of the three policy choices. The results support that levels of insider 
ownership differ systematically across firms and high insider ownership firms choose lower 
levels of both debt and dividends. Furthermore, they support a modified "pecking order" 
hypothesis, because of the effects of profitability, growth, and investment spending on debt 
and dividend policy. The authors confirm that managerial ownership has a negative impact 
on dividend payout policy and firm debt. 
Later, Espen Eckbo and Verma (1994) shows that dividends are a negative function of the 
increasing power of managerial ownership. Their results conclude that manager-controlled 
firms are associated with very low cash dividends due to the absolute voting power of the 
managers.  
A different study is the one from Schooley and Barney (1994) that finds a significant 
relationship between dividend yield and CEO stock ownership in 235 industrial firms in US, 
using data around 1980. The authors find evidence that until the CEO becomes entrenched, 
increased executive stock ownership reduces agency costs and decreases dividend yield. 
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Afterwards, increased stock ownership increases dividend yield. The results from this study 
can give important insights to discuss the insider ownership as a mechanism to reduce agency 
costs. 
Another interesting study is the one from Farinha (2003b), performed in United Kingdom 
using data for two five year periods (1987–91 and 1992–96) and with 600 firms as sample. 
In a cross-sectional analysis of dividend policies in the UK, the author finds evidence of a 
strong U-shaped relationship between dividend pay-outs and insider ownership. More 
precisely, after a critical entrenchment level estimated around 30%, the coefficient of insider 
ownership changes from negative to positive. Additionally, Farinha (2003b) also show 
evidence that beneficial and non-beneficial insider holdings may contribute to entrenchment.  
More recently, Florackis et al. (2015) examined the relation between dividend policy, 
managerial ownership and debt-financing for 7376 companies listed on NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ. They used standard and semi-parametric estimation methods to capture more 
effectively non-linearities in the data. The results of the study, in line with the alignment 
effect of managerial ownership, support a negative relationship between managerial 
ownership and dividends when managerial ownership is at relatively low levels. However, 
the negative relationship turns into a positive one at very high levels of managerial ownership. 
This relationship also differs significantly across firms with different levels of debt.  
From the several studies identified, the main outcome is that agency theory provides useful 
insights to try to explain dividend policies of firms but cannot fully explain how firms 
determine it. 
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2.5  Critical analysis of the literature  
To better understand the relation between dividends, ownership structure and leverage 
within firms, first we should look at the major differences in ownership structures.  
In the United States or the United Kingdom, the ownership of companies is often dispersed 
and it is said that each individual shareholder has only limited incentives and ability to 
monitor the manager’s activities. The main conflict of governance in these companies is 
between powerful managers and small outside shareholders. Indeed, dividend payments are 
seen as a means to reduce the free cash flow that managers can use discretionally (Jensen, 
1986).  
In contrast, in continental Europe, the scenario is quite different. The ownership structures 
of companies are concentrated and large shareholders have huge incentives and ability to 
control management. The board of directors generally operates as an advisory committee 
rather than controlling the company’s operations. As a result, the manager-shareholder 
conflict does not appear to be a concern, whereas the expropriation of minority shareholders 
seems to be. Several authors argue that there is a potential conflict between the large 
controlling shareholder and small minority shareholders (La Porta et al., 2000). Large 
shareholders may harm the economic interests of the minority by refusing to declare 
dividends or attempting a squeeze out. In these governance systems, legal protection of 
minority shareholders is an issue. Efficient corporate governance including monitoring 
management and shareholder protection can reduce agency problems (La Porta et al., 2000).  
In Portugal, in general, companies are characterised by large shareholders. The largest 
shareholder, with majority control, has considerable power and discretion over important 
decisions, like dividend payments.  
Finally, from the arguments presented, it is proven that dividend policy has an important role 
in monitoring management and reducing agency costs. With the discussion of similar studies, 
it is possible to sustain that the relation between managerial ownership and dividends may 
be complex to analyse. However, considering the studies developed in the last years, there is 
an evident lack in the academic literature, with respect to dividend policy in the view of 
agency theory in Portugal. Therefore, this study will help prove/disprove existing literature 
and will give new insights to help managers and shareholders in the process of decision-
making. 
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3. Methodology 
3.1  Empirical Hypotheses 
To perform our investigation, first, we want to test if there is U-shaped relationship between 
dividends and managerial ownership for Portuguese companies, in accordance with the 
managerial entrenchment hypothesis. This hypothesis was previously studied in Schooley 
and Barney (1994) for US firms, in Farinha (2003b) for UK firms and more recently in 
Florackis et al. (2015),  also for US firms. This relationship between the dividend payout ratio 
and ownership concentration within a firm is not strictly negative, turning positive in a certain 
ownership level, due to entrenchment effect.  
When managers hold little equity and shareholders are too dispersed to take disciplining 
actions, managers will prefer to retain earnings instead of paying dividends to ensure the 
growth of the company as well as to maximise their own personal benefits (Jensen, 1986). 
This means that, before a critical entrenchment level of ownership concentration, large 
amounts of dividends have to be paid out to reduce retained earnings and prevent managers 
from investing in projects with negative Net Present Value (NPV) for the sake of building a 
larger managerial empire. In contrast, when ownership is concentrated, shareholders gain 
more control over the firm and the management actions, reducing the monitoring costs, 
which in turn reduce the agency conflict. Therefore, before this critical entrenchment level, 
ownership concentration and dividends work as substitutes to reduce the agency costs, 
suggesting a negative relationship exists between these two mechanisms: when one increases, 
the other decreases.  
On the other hand, when ownership concentration surpasses the critical entrenchment level, 
the dividend payout ratio rises to mitigate the agency costs due to entrenched managers. In 
this phase, it is observed a positive relationship between dividend policy and insider 
ownership. Hence, to test this relationship, we considered the following hypotheses: 
 
H1: Managerial ownership of Portuguese firms is negatively related to dividends, when managerial ownership 
is at relatively low levels. 
 
H2: The relation between managerial ownership and dividends in Portuguese firms is positive, when 
managerial ownership is at high levels. 
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The recent studies of Farinha (2003b) and Florackis et al. (2015) show that the investigation 
of the impact of managerial ownership and firm debt in dividend policy of a firm is crucial. 
The results of Farinha (2003b) identify a significant U-shaped relationship between dividend 
payouts and insider ownership characterised by a critical level of entrenchment for 
managerial ownership at 30%. This means that there is a negative relation between payouts 
and insider ownership until a turning point in the region of 30%, where the relation becomes 
positive. This result is consistent with the agency perspective, however inconsistent with tax 
or signalling theories. In contrast, the semi-parametric approach in Florackis et al. (2015) 
demonstrates a relationship with more than one turning point. The study supports a negative 
relationship between managerial ownership and dividends when managerial ownership is at 
relatively low levels, lower than 10 percent, which is consistent with the alignment effect of 
managerial ownership. In addition, it supports a positive relationship between dividends and 
managerial ownership at very high levels of managerial ownership, higher than 60 percent, 
supporting either the entrenchment effect of managerial ownership or the existence of strong 
managerial preferences over dividends for liquidity reasons. The main conclusion of 
Florackis et al. (2015) is that the relation for ownership levels between 10 percent and 60 
percent seems to be flat, contradicting previous evidence by Schooley and Barney (1994) and 
Farinha (2003b), which in the authors’ point of view, can only be explained in the context of 
tax and signalling theories. 
Florackis et al. (2015) found evidence that the relationship between managerial ownership 
and dividends differs significantly across firms with different levels of debt. Particularly, they 
found that for high-leverage firms which are subject to monitoring by debtholders, dividends 
and ownership are substitute mechanisms to reduce the agency costs. On the contrary, for 
low-leverage firms, since they lack this monitoring mechanism for controlling agency costs, 
the firms may be exposed to entrenchment problems at higher levels of managerial 
ownership. For this reason, we want to clarify the existing relations between dividends and 
managerial ownership for these two opposite groups. 
We also want to assess two groups of firms separately: one with low-leverage firms and other 
with high-leverage firms. This analysis will allow testing for potential relations between 
dividends and managerial ownership considering different levels of debt. The hypotheses 
are: 
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H3: There is no significant relation between dividends and managerial ownership, for low-leverage Portuguese 
firms. 
 
H4: There is a negative relation between dividends and managerial ownership, for high-leverage Portuguese 
firms. 
 
Corporate boards play an important role in monitoring and controlling management and its 
quality can be examined through different characteristics: the composition of the board, 
which means the size of the board and the type of directors. With respect to governance 
issues, the analysis will focus on several characteristics of the board of directors to understand 
and interpret their relationship with dividends.  
The size of a board is important to monitor management. Previous studies have shown two 
opposite results about the influence of board size on dividend policy. On the one hand, the 
results support that larger boards allow greater specialization which can lead to more 
effective monitoring (Klein, 2002). In fact, larger boards can provide greater expertise and 
diversity of knowledge but also valuable outside advisors, working as an efficient monitoring 
force. For this reason, lower dividends are required as a monitoring mechanism. Similarly, 
the signalling theory defends a large board size, which can be perceived as a good signal to 
the market. As a result, dividend payments are not required to reduce agency costs.  
On the other hand, Jensen (1993) supports that large boards might indicate weak monitoring. 
Larger boards are less effective than the smaller boards due to the difficulty of coordinating 
large groups. Despite all the arguments, in Portugal, in general, the boards of directors are 
small in size and some with family-related directors. Therefore, we expect that smaller-sized 
boards result in lower monitoring costs. Nevertheless, to avoid any expropriation of internal 
resources, shareholders may require higher dividend payments. Thus, such weak monitoring 
mechanisms will be substituted by dividends payments, which is in line with the substitution 
hypothesis (La Porta et al., 2000). Drawing on the above discussion, we expect that board 
size should have a significant relation with dividend payments: 
H5: There is a significant relation between dividends and board size for Portuguese firms 
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Board independence is considered a significant characteristic of board structure. An 
independent director is usually a member of the audit, remuneration and nomination 
committees and his role is important to ensure the integrity of financial statement disclosures 
and to guarantee appropriate internal controls in the company. According to Rozeff (1982), 
when management control mechanisms are weak, shareholders use dividends to monitor the 
management. If independent directors are an effective monitoring mechanism, then board 
independence and dividend policy should be substitutes to reduce agency problems. Thus, 
considering that the existence of independent directors in a board strengthens the control 
power of shareholders, dividend payments are reduced. Based on this argument, our testable 
hypothesis is the following: 
H6: There is a negative relation between dividends and independent directors for Portuguese firms 
 
Finally, we want to test CEO duality. The perspective in Jensen (1993) is that, when the same 
person is the CEO and Chairman of the board, the board of the directors cannot perform 
its key function. In this case, the internal control system will be very weak, and the CEO will 
get more power to control the board of directors. It will consequently have impact on the 
independence of the board of directors. Probably the CEO will pursue his own interests and 
not all shareholders’ interests. Baliga et al. (1996) suggest that in case of the CEO and 
chairman duality, the board is less effective in control mechanisms. This result is in line with 
the arguments of the agency theory, which states that duality promotes CEO entrenchment 
by reducing board monitoring effectiveness.  
In Portugal, some firms show CEO duality, which implies a high portion of insiders. This 
specific nature of board composition should have a negative effect on board performance, 
leading to an increase of agency costs. As such, to better monitor managers and to limit their 
expropriation of free cash flow, shareholders require higher dividend payments. Thus, we 
want to test the following hypothesis: 
H7: There is a positive relationship between the CEO duality and dividends in Portugal. 
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3.2  Empirical Model 
The empirical approach consists of a panel data regression model to examine the relationship 
between dividend payments, ownership structure and board governance. Panel data is a 
dataset in which the behaviour of firms is described in two dimensions, in particular, time 
and individuals (companies). Panel datasets allow to control for individual heterogeneity due 
to hidden factors, to analyse a broader set of data and to obtain more variability. With this 
approach, the degrees of freedom are increased, the collinearity among the explanatory 
variables is reduced and the efficiency of the economic estimation is improved. Panel data 
analysis can better detect effects that are not observable in cross sections or time series data 
(Wooldridge, 2015). 
The general form of the model can be written as follows: 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝑋
′
𝑖,𝑡𝛽 +  𝜇𝑖,𝑡  
Where: 
𝛼 is scalar, 
𝛽 is K 𝑋′𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑋
′
𝑖,𝑡 is the i,t th observation on K explanatory variables, 
i = 1, ..., N ;  t = 1, …,T 
Additionally, it is assumed that the 𝜇𝑖,𝑡  follows a one-way error component model: 
𝜇𝑖,𝑡 =  𝜇𝑖 +  𝑣𝑖,𝑡 
where 𝜇𝑖 is time-invariant and it accounts for any unobservable individual-specific effect that 
is not included in the regression model and the term 𝑣𝑖,𝑡 denotes the remainder disturbance 
and it varies with the individuals and time and can be thought of as the usual disturbance in 
the regression.  
The most common estimation methods for panel data are the pooled OLS, the fixed effects 
and the random effects models. In the random effect model, 𝜇𝑖 are assumed random and the 
𝜇𝑖 are independent of the 𝑣𝑖,𝑡. Additionally, the 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 are independent of the 𝜇𝑖 and 𝑣𝑖,𝑡, for 
all i and t. In contrast, in the fixed effects model, the 𝜇𝑖 are assumed to be fixed parameters 
to be estimated and the remainder disturbances stochastic with 𝑣𝑖,𝑡  independent and 
identically distributed, i.e. 𝑣𝑖,𝑡~ 𝑖𝑖𝑑(0, 𝜎𝑣
2). The 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 are assumed independent of the 𝑣𝑖,𝑡  
for all i and t.  
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The fixed versus random effects issue has generated an extensive debate in the econometrics 
literature. We will perform the described tests in order to identify which model is more 
suitable to the properties of the dataset. In addition, we will use a specification test proposed 
by Hausman (1978) which is based on the difference between the fixed and random effects 
estimators. 
In our analysis, we will perform an empirical model to investigate the effect of managerial 
ownership and board governance on dividend policy for a sample of 25 Portuguese listed 
companies over the period of 2007 to 2016.  
In our analysis, the empirical model (1) is the following: 
𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽𝑜  +  𝛽1𝑀𝐴𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝐴𝑁
2
𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀_𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁_𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽10𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃_𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑁𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑋𝐸_𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑂𝐿𝐷_𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽13𝑊𝑂𝑀𝐸𝑁_𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽14𝐸𝑋𝑃_𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽15𝐶𝐻𝐴𝐼𝑅𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 
 
Where 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡 is the dependent variable that defines the dividend payments by given company 
in a given year. There are two measures of ownership structure used in this analysis. 𝑀𝐴𝑁𝑖,𝑡 
is managerial ownership of a given company in a given year and 𝑀𝐴𝑁2𝑖,𝑡 is the squared 
managerial ownership. Six control variables are used in this study: 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 is the level of debt 
of a given company in a given year, 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is the  Return on Assets, 𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀_𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is firm 
size of a given company in a given year, 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡 the Capital Expenditures, 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡 is the 
Cash Holdings and 𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁_𝑄𝑖,𝑡. In addition, six measures of board governance are used: 
𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡  represents the number of directors in a given company in a given year, 
𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃_𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑡  the number of independent directors, 𝑁𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑋𝐸_𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑡  the number of 
Non-executive directors, 𝑂𝐿𝐷_𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑡  the number of Old directors, 𝑊𝑂𝑀𝐸𝑁_𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑡  the 
number of Women directors and 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅_𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑡 the number of Experienced directors in a 
Board of Directors of a given company in a given year. We also add a dummy variable  
𝐶𝐻𝐴𝐼𝑅𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡 that assumes the value 1 if the CEO is also the Chairman of the Board and 0 
otherwise. 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. 
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Table 1 provides the definitions of all the variables used in our analysis.  
 
TABLE 1 - VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
 
 
Additionally, it will be created two different groups, one for high-leverage firms and one for 
low-leverage firms. For comparison purposes and considering that the methodology uses 
panel data, we assigned 12 companies to each group according to the average value of debt 
in the period between 2007 and 2016.  
VARIABLE NAME DEFINITION 
 
DIVIDENDS (percent)  
Dependent  variable 
The ratio of total dividends to total assets 
MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP 
(percent)  
The percentage of shares held by the executive directors, as reported in firms’ 
annual reports 
 
LEVERAGE (percent)  
 
The ratio of total debt to total assets 
 
FIRM_SIZE The natural logarithm of Market Value of Equity 
 
ROA The ratio of Net Income to total assets 
 
CAPEX (percent)  The ratio of capital expenditures to total assets 
 
CASH HOLDINGS (percent)  
 
The ratio of cash holdings to total assets 
 
TOBIN’S Q Ratio of the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market 
value of equity to the book value of assets 
 
BOARDSIZE The natural logarithm of total number of directors on the board 
 
INDEPENDENT_DIRECTORS 
(percent)  
The ratio of the number of all fully independent directors on a given board to 
the total number of directors on the board 
 
NONEXECUTIVE_DIRECTORS 
(percent)  
The ratio of the number of non-executive directors to the total number of 
directors on the board 
 
OLD_DIRECTORS  
(percent)  
The ratio of the number of all directors over the age of 65 on a given board to 
the total number of directors on the board 
 
WOMEN_DIRECTORS  
(percent)  
The ratio of the number of all female directors to the total number of directors 
on the board 
 
EXPERIENCED_DIRECTORS 
(percent)  
The ratio of all directors with tenure exceeding 10 years on a given board to the 
total number of directors on the board 
 
CHAIR_CEO  Dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO is also the Chairman of the Board and 
0 otherwise 
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Because of the number of observations of each group, we developed an adjusted empirical 
model (2) where we had eliminated a selection of variables from the empirical model (1) in 
order to run the regressions.  
The adjusted empirical model (2) for the estimation of high-leverage and low-leverage firms 
is the following: 
𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽𝑜  + 𝛽1𝑀𝐴𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝐴𝑁
2
𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀_𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁_𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃_𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽10𝑁𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑋𝐸_𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐶𝐻𝐴𝐼𝑅𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 
 
Where 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡 is the dependent variable that defines the dividend payments by given company 
in a given year. The definitions of the two measures of ownership structure (MAN and 
MAN2), the five control variables (LEV, ROA, FIRM_SIZE, CASH and TOBIN_Q), the 
three measures of corporate governance (BOARDSIZE, INDEP_DIR and 
NONEXE_DIR) and the dummy variable (CHAIRCEO) are previously described in Table 
1. 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. 
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3.3  Empirical Variables 
For a better understanding of the empirical model, this subsection describes the variables of 
the analysis.  
Following Florackis et al. (2015), the dependent variable will be dividends, denoted by DIV, 
and defined as the ratio of total dividends to total assets. The main explanatory variable will 
be managerial ownership, denoted by MAN, and will be defined as the percentage of shares 
held by the executive directors, as disclosed in firms’ annual financial reports.  
 MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP: The evidence in Farinha (2003b) and Florackis et al. 
(2015) is that the effect of managerial ownership in the reduction of agency costs may 
change its sign after a certain critical level of ownership on the possibility of managerial 
entrenchment. To test that relationship, we also introduced a square variable of 
managerial ownership in the regression. We expect a negative coefficient of MAN and a 
positive coefficient of MAN2 – as according to Farinha (2003b) and Florackis et al. 
(2015). 
Additionally, we used a set of controls in the empirical models to investigate their effect on 
dividend payments. The control factors selected for this study are identified in the academic 
literature as potentially influent to Dividend Policy of firms and as substitutes or 
complementary monitoring mechanisms in the presence of agency problems. 
In the academic literature, dividend policy is commonly associated with leverage, 
profitability, investment ratios and firm size. Therefore, in this study we will include six 
accounting measures as control variables: 
 LEVERAGE: is defined as the ratio of book value of debt to total assets. It was 
considered in the model due to its potential monitoring role of managers. According to 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1988), among others, financial 
leverage is a monitoring mechanism that potentially reduces agency costs arising from 
the conflicts between managers and shareholders. Assuming that debt is a substitute to 
dividend payments, we expect that leverage has a negative impact on dividend payments. 
 RETURN ON ASSETS: Representing a profitability measure, ROA is defined as the 
ratio of Net Income to total assets. Profitability is considered as an indicator of the firm’s 
capacity to pay dividends. Jensen et al. (1992) finds evidence of a positive association 
between return on assets and dividend pay-outs. Dividend pay-outs may be positively 
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related with measures of profitability (Miller & Rock, 1985). ROA is seen as an important 
factor of dividend policy decisions, so we expect this variable to have a positive impact 
on dividend payments of Portuguese listed companies. 
 FIRM SIZE: is defined as the natural logarithm of market capitalisation. In fact, size may 
be an important factor and dividends can be expected to be higher in larger firms. 
However, there are authors with a different point of view, arguing that the theoretical 
basis for an impact of firm size on dividend policy is not strong, and indeed some 
negative relationships have been observed (Smith & Watts, 1992). Therefore, we will not 
expect a particular sign in this variable. 
 CAPEX: is defined as the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. For this coefficient 
we expect a negative sign because firms with high capital expenditures are less likely to 
make large dividend payments. 
 CASH HOLDINGS: defined as the percentage of cash and cash equivalents over total 
assets, is clearly related to the firm’s free cash-flow (Jensen, 1986). When there are agency 
conflicts between managers and shareholders, managers tend to accumulate cash in order 
to proceed with their investment strategies. Dittmar et al. (2003) highlights the 
importance of the agency problem as a deterministic factor that influences cash holdings.  
Therefore, higher availability of cash, higher the probability to pay dividends and thus, 
the expected sign for this regression coefficient is positive.  
 TOBIN’S Q: is defined as the ratio of the market value of a company’s assets to the 
replacement cost of those firm's physical assets. This ratio measure the wealth generated 
by a company for its shareholders, as it compares how much more a company is worth 
when compared to the book value of its assets. A low Tobin’s Q, between 0 and 1, means 
that the cost to replace the firm's assets is greater than the value of its stock, which implies 
that the stock is undervalued. The firm would be better off selling its assets. In contrast, 
a high Q, greater than 1, is generally a good sign because it indicates that the company is 
worth more than the sum of its assets. The firm's stock is more expensive than the 
replacement cost of its assets. Additional investment in the firm would be a great strategy 
because the profits generated would exceed the cost of firm's assets. Tobin’s Q is used 
as a proxy for investment opportunity set. We expect that, with the rise in firm’s assets 
value, there will be a positive change in dividend distribution. 
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Moreover, existing literature has demonstrated that governance quality has a significant 
impact on critical corporate decisions, including dividend policy. Thus, controlling for the 
impact of corporate governance is crucial in this analysis. Regarding governance measures, 
we have six control variables, as described below: 
 BOARDSIZE: measured as the number of directors on the corporate Board (Florackis 
et al., 2015), it is considered an important variable influencing the quality of management 
control. As mentioned before, previous studies show divergent results about the 
influence of board size on dividend payments. Therefore, we expect a significant impact 
of this variable on dividend payments but not any particular sign. 
 INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS: defined as the ratio of the number of all fully 
independent directors to the total number of directors on a given board. Independent 
directors may act as a monitoring device for the firm’s management and, therefore, create 
a need for higher dividend payments. A negative relation is expected. 
 NONEXECUTIVE DIRECTORS: Non-executive directors add expertise and 
objectivity that mitigate managerial entrenchment of firm resources (Harford et al., 2008) 
and they act in favour of shareholders’ interests. Thus, we expected that non-executive 
directors on the firm’s board minimise management autonomy and play a monitoring 
role (Fama, 1980; Weisbach, 1988; Winter Jr, 1977).  Therefore, the expected sign for 
this coefficient is negative. 
 OLD DIRECTORS: It is defined as the ratio of the number of all directors over the age 
of 65 on a given board to the total number of directors on the board. With this variable 
we want to assess the influence of the age of directors on dividend policy decisions. 
 WOMEN DIRECTORS: It is defined as the ratio of the number of all female directors 
to the total number of directors on the board. Similarly, we want to analyse if the 
presence of women in the Board of Directors has a positive or negative influence on the 
Dividend Policy decisions of firms. 
 EXPERIENCED DIRECTORS: This variable is the ratio of all directors with tenure 
exceeding 10 years on a given board to the total number of directors on the Board of 
Directors. With respect to this coefficient, we expect that directors with more years in a 
given board, will better know the market and the interests of managers and shareholders. 
We do not expect any particular sign for this regression coefficient. 
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 CHAIR CEO: It is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO is also the Chairman of 
the Board of Directors and 0 otherwise. As previously discussed, we want to investigate 
the effect of CEO duality on Portuguese company’s Dividend Policy. The 
CEO/Chairman may exert his/her authority in the processes of decision making. 
Therefore, higher dividend payments is needed for monitoring purposes. We expect a 
positive sign. 
 
 
 
3.4  Collection of sample, data and databases 
For this dissertation, it will be used a sample of 25 Portuguese listed firms in Euronext Lisbon 
which annually pay dividends to its shareholders. Financial companies (banks) and sports 
clubs will be excluded from the sample as they are subject to different regulations and follow 
different investment and dividend polices. The analysis was performed for a period of 10 
years, from 2007 to 2016, to get a substantial number of observations. The final sample 
comprises 248 firm-year observations. 
In the present study, the data is compiled from different sources. The data on managerial 
ownership, board structure and several other board and director characteristics will be 
compiled from firm’s annual financial reports from 2007 to 2016. Financial data on 
dividends, leverage (external debt) and other accounting measures and market variables will 
be obtained from Thompson Reuters EIKON. 
The final sample is shown in Annex 1. In Annex 2 we also present a graph with the number 
of companies in our sample by industry type. 
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4. Empirical results 
In this section, we present the results of the regressions analysis. Firstly, we show the main 
descriptive statistics of the sample for the period 2007-2016 and the results of the empirical 
models. Then, the conclusions concerning the relation between the governance variables and 
dividends are described. At last, we present an analysis concerning the relation between 
dividends and high-leverage and low-leverage firms by comparing results from the two 
subsamples. 
 
4.1  Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2, which show the value of mean, standard 
deviation, median, quantile 25%, quantile 75%, minimum and maximum. The data set 
combine a total of 248 observations of 25 Portuguese non-financial companies over a period 
of 10 years. 
TABLE 2 - DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR ALL FIRMS 
Note: This table provides descriptive statistics of all variables used in the analysis. The sample contains 25 non-
financial Portuguese companies over the 2007-2016 period. Definitions of all variables are reported in Table 1. 
 
First, the dependent variable, DIV, registers a mean of 0.021, which means that on average 
firms paid a total of 2.1% of dividends from 2007 to 2016. However, we can observe a 
variation in the dependent variable across firms over the time period as shown by the 
standard deviation of 0.025, with a minimum and maximum dividend payments of 0% and 
 Mean  Std. Dev.  Maximum Q3  Median Q1  Minimum  Skewness  Kurtosis
DIV 0.021 0.025 0.181 0.029 0.014 0.004 0.000 2.442 11.752
MAN 0.246 0.287 0.884 0.531 0.025 0.000 0.000 0.617 1.804
LEVERAGE 0.684 0.179 1.055 0.810 0.720 0.566 0.032 -1.119 5.292
ROA 0.019 0.153 0.374 0.044 0.028 0.013 -2.246 -13.301 197.599
FIRM_SIZE 5.865 2.262 9.697 7.454 6.016 4.519 0.000 -0.636 3.317
CAPEX 0.049 0.040 0.231 0.072 0.041 0.018 0.000 1.276 4.952
CASH 0.075 0.095 0.563 0.094 0.048 0.016 0.000 2.711 11.775
TOBIN_Q 1.125 0.420 3.612 1.246 1.022 0.897 0.472 2.278 11.090
BOARDSIZE 10.536 5.719 30.000 14.000 9.000 6.000 3.000 1.144 4.169
INDEP_DIR 0.228 0.202 0.800 0.333 0.250 0.000 0.000 0.447 2.509
NONEXE_DIR 0.516 0.236 0.917 0.677 0.571 0.388 0.000 -0.859 3.080
OLD_DIR 0.155 0.129 0.500 0.237 0.148 0.059 0.000 0.474 2.240
WOMEN_DIR 0.098 0.105 0.429 0.167 0.068 0.000 0.000 0.897 2.933
EXPER_DIR 0.257 0.276 1.000 0.429 0.186 0.000 0.000 1.005 3.257
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18.13%, respectively. The median value indicates that 50% of the sample show a ratio of 
total dividends to total assets equal or above 1.4%. 
With respect to the level of managerial ownership, the mean is 0.246 and the standard 
deviation is 0.287, which suggests that the average level of firm’s shares held by managers of 
Portuguese companies in the sample from 2007 to 2016 is 24.6%. From the results, we 
observe that the managerial ownership of the companies in the sample has a maximum of 
88.4% and a minimum of 0%. 
In addition, the sample shows for LEVERAGE an average value of 0.684 and a maximum 
of 1.055. The standard deviation (0.179) suggests that there is no considerable variations of 
this specific variable across the sample. With respect to ROA, we can observe that the mean 
is relatively low (1.9%) when compared with the maximum reported (37.4%). 
The sample also includes both small and large firms (with a mean and standard deviation for 
FIRM_SIZE of 5.865 and 2.262, respectively).  
Regarding CAPEX, we can conclude that the maximum value for CAPEX in Portuguese 
companies in the sample from 2007 to 2016 was 23.4%, whereas the minimum was 0%. 
CASH showed a maximum value of 0.563 and the mean value was 0.075. 
With respect to Tobin’s Q, the mean value was 1.125, which implies that on average 
Portuguese companies’ stocks in the sample during the period from 2007-2016 were 
overvalued. The maximum value was 3.612, whereas the minimum value is 0.472, which 
remains between 0 and 1 (undervalued).  
About BOARDSIZE, we can observe that the mean number of Directors in the Board is 
10, while the maximum number is 30 and the minimum 3. Furthermore, the average value 
of this variable is curiously superior to the optimal number of Directors in a Board as 
suggested in the literature - of seven or eight people (Jensen, 1993). However, the results of 
BOARDSIZE show a standard deviation of 5.719, explaining a huge variation of this specific 
variable across the sample.  
Regarding the other corporate governance variables, we can conclude that from 2007 to 2016 
the average percentage of independent directors (INDEP_DIR) in a given board of 
Directors was 22.8%, the average percentage of non-executive directors (NONEXE_DIR) 
was 51.6% and the average percentage of directors with 65 years or more in a given board 
(OLD_DIR) was 15.5%. In addition, the average percentage of women directors 
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(WOMEN_DIR) was 9.8% and the average percentage of directors with at least 10 years of 
experience in a given Board of Directors (EXPER_DIR) was 25.7%. 
With respect to the maximum values, in our sample, the maximum percentage of 
independent directors (INDEP_DIR) in a given board of Directors was 80%, the maximum 
percentage of non-executive directors (NONEXE_DIR) was 91.7% and the maximum 
percentage of directors with 65 years or more in a given board (OLD_DIR) was 50%. 
Moreover, the maximum percentage of women directors (WOMEN_DIR) was 42.9% and 
the maximum percentage of directors with at least 10 years of experience in a given Board 
of Directors (EXPER_DIR) was 100%. The standard deviation of these variables confirms 
some dispersion of the results between companies along the period of analysis (2007-2016). 
Among all the variables, the standard deviation of the variable BOARDSIZE is the highest 
whereas the variable DIV shows the lowest standard deviation. Based on these results, we 
can conclude that the percentage of dividends over total assets is quite similar across firms 
along the period of the study. 
In addition, Figure 1 presents a graph with the evolution of the average of the independent 
variable DIV, defined as the ratio of dividends over total assets, for all the sample of 25 
Portuguese firms, comparing the two subsamples of 12 high-leverage firms and 12 low-
leverage firms for the period between 2007 to 2016.  
From the graph, we can observe that low-leverage firms pay more dividends than high-
leverage firms. In 2009 and 2011 the percentage of dividend payments had decreased 
compared to previous years, possibly due to the financial crisis. It was only in 2016 that low-
leverage firms achieved an average percentage of dividends to total assets of 3,6%. The 
lowest average percentage of dividends paid was in 2011 for high-leverage firms. 
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FIGURE 1 - EVOLUTION OF THE RATIO OF DIVIDENDS TO TOTAL ASSETS 
 
Note: The figure shows the average of the ratio of dividends to total assets for the sample of 25 Portuguese 
firms, for the group of 12 low-leverage firms and the group of 12 high-leverage firms from the period of 2007 
to 2016.  
 
For comparison purposes, we also present the descriptive statistics for the two subsamples 
of high-leverage and low-leverage firms in our sample in Table 3 and 4, with the value of 
mean, standard deviation, median, quantile 25%, quantile 75%, minimum and maximum. 
With respect to the dependent variable, DIV, the high-leverage firms showed a mean value 
of 0.019, which means that on average the group of firms with high levels of debt paid a total 
of 1.9% dividends from 2007 to 2016. On the contrary, the low-leverage firms showed a 
mean value of 0.024, meaning that the group of firms with low level of debt paid on average 
a total of 2.4% dividends from 2007 to 2016. From these results, we can conclude that low-
leverage firms pay a higher percentage of dividends to their shareholders than high-leverage 
firms. 
Moreover, the mean level of managerial ownership in high-leverage firms is 0.129, suggesting 
that the average percentage of shares held by management in Portuguese high-leverage 
companies is 12.9%. In contrast, in low-leverage firms the mean level of managerial 
ownership is 31.8%, a value clearly superior when compared to the group of firms with high-
leverage. 
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TABLE 3 - DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR HIGH-LEVERAGE FIRMS 
 
Note: This table provides descriptive statistics of all variables used for the group of high-leverage firms. The 
sample contains 12 non-financial Portuguese companies over the 2007-2016 period. Definitions of all variables 
are reported in Table 1. 
 
 
TABLE 4 - DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR LOW-LEVERAGE FIRMS 
 
Note: This table provides descriptive statistics of all variables used for the group of low-leverage firms. The 
sample contains 12 non-financial Portuguese companies over the 2007-2016 period. Definitions of all variables 
are reported in Table 1. 
 
 
 Mean  Std. Dev.  Maximum Q3  Median Q1  Minimum  Skewness  Kurtosis
DIV 0.019 0.020 0.117 0.023 0.014 0.005 0.000 2.103 8.671
MAN 0.129 0.200 0.838 0.231 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.346 3.588
LEVERAGE 0.807 0.082 1.055 0.862 0.798 0.751 0.536 -0.075 3.695
ROA 0.025 0.040 0.104 0.038 0.027 0.016 -0.301 -4.899 40.021
FIRM_SIZE 6.283 2.189 9.697 7.567 6.744 5.056 0.000 -1.179 4.727
CAPEX 0.055 0.042 0.231 0.078 0.042 0.024 0.005 1.292 4.800
CASH 0.082 0.118 0.563 0.088 0.049 0.016 0.000 2.599 9.345
TOBIN_Q 1.235 0.442 3.612 1.313 1.069 0.994 0.741 2.454 10.594
BOARDSIZE 11.229 5.940 30.000 14.000 10.000 7.000 3.000 1.380 4.828
INDEP_DIR 0.229 0.194 0.778 0.375 0.250 0.000 0.000 0.366 2.520
NONEXE_DIR 0.516 0.272 0.917 0.700 0.600 0.429 0.000 -0.842 2.611
OLD_DIR 0.156 0.131 0.444 0.222 0.154 0.059 0.000 0.489 2.216
WOMEN_DIR 0.109 0.105 0.400 0.182 0.100 0.000 0.000 0.532 2.268
EXPER_DIR 0.272 0.261 1.000 0.444 0.222 0.000 0.000 0.670 2.467
 Mean  Std. Dev.  Maximum Q3  Median Q1  Minimum  Skewness  Kurtosis
DIV 0.024 0.030 0.181 0.033 0.015 0.001 0.000 2.267 10.037
MAN 0.318 0.299 0.884 0.618 0.307 0.000 0.000 0.124 1.391
LEVERAGE 0.559 0.167 0.983 0.636 0.565 0.502 0.032 -1.120 6.098
ROA 0.013 0.216 0.374 0.049 0.033 0.011 -2.246 -9.684 102.048
FIRM_SIZE 5.694 2.236 9.632 7.545 5.321 4.415 0.000 -0.400 3.179
CAPEX 0.047 0.038 0.204 0.066 0.041 0.017 0.000 1.190 4.817
CASH 0.063 0.064 0.314 0.093 0.043 0.011 0.000 1.377 4.990
TOBIN_Q 1.030 0.389 3.274 1.210 0.958 0.791 0.472 2.106 11.284
BOARDSIZE 10.158 5.579 25.000 14.500 8.500 6.000 3.000 0.758 2.705
INDEP_DIR 0.203 0.192 0.625 0.333 0.250 0.000 0.000 0.376 2.025
NONEXE_DIR 0.517 0.198 0.875 0.649 0.567 0.369 0.000 -0.732 3.334
OLD_DIR 0.144 0.116 0.429 0.222 0.143 0.059 0.000 0.400 2.186
WOMEN_DIR 0.095 0.106 0.429 0.143 0.063 0.000 0.000 1.161 3.584
EXPER_DIR 0.251 0.298 1.000 0.429 0.111 0.000 0.000 1.181 3.542
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4.2  Correlation Analysis 
Additionally, we performed correlation analysis between the variables to investigate the 
existence of possible correlation among them. Table 5 reports the correlation coefficients 
between the main variables used in the study. In a correlation analysis, the coefficients of 
correlations between the independent variables must not exceed 0.80, otherwise, a coefficient 
greater than 0.80 may reveal multi-collinearity. From the results, we can argue that multi-
collinearity is not a potential problem in the regression models.  
From the results, several interesting relations can be highlighted. First, the correlation 
coefficients between Dividends and ROA, FIRM_SIZE, CAPEX, CASH and TOBIN Q are 
positive and the correlation coefficient between Dividends and DEBT is negative, as we 
expected. 
Dividends (DIV) does not show significantly positive or negative correlations. The strongest 
correlation between variables is equal to 0.639 between BOARDSIZE and FIRM_SIZE.  
Therefore, according to the table below, the correlation matrix suggests the existence of a 
reasonable relationship between all variables, in which none of the variables in the study is 
highly correlated. 
 
TABLE 5 - CORRELATION MATRIX FOR ALL FIRMS 
Notes: This table reports the correlation between variables used in the analysis. The sample contains 25 non-
financial companies over the 2007-2016 period. Definitions of all variables are reported in Table 1. 
 
  
DIV MAN LEV ROA
FIRM 
SIZE
CAPEX CASH
TOBIN 
Q
BOARD
SIZE
INDEP 
DIR
NONEX
E DIR
OLD 
DIR
WOMEN 
DIR
EXPER 
DIR
DIV 1.000
MAN -0.286 1.000
LEVERAGE -0.128 -0.349 1.000
ROA 0.120 0.046 0.227 1.000
FIRM_SIZE 0.219 -0.395 0.012 0.074 1.000
CAPEX 0.064 -0.191 0.073 0.111 0.464 1.000
CASH 0.195 -0.088 0.038 -0.023 -0.158 -0.202 1.000
TOBIN_Q 0.398 -0.344 0.232 0.169 0.506 0.395 0.039 1.000
BOARDSIZE 0.212 -0.564 0.169 0.003 0.639 0.312 -0.081 0.190 1.000
INDEP_DIR -0.011 -0.090 0.026 -0.018 0.297 0.179 0.004 0.061 0.343 1.000
NONEXE_DIR 0.291 -0.370 -0.030 -0.042 0.546 0.200 -0.232 0.296 0.567 0.509 1.000
OLD_DIR 0.033 0.186 0.028 -0.037 0.103 -0.035 0.049 -0.023 0.018 0.139 0.144 1.000
WOMEN_DIR -0.091 0.210 -0.107 0.003 -0.071 -0.177 0.023 -0.114 -0.153 -0.255 -0.082 -0.047 1.000
EXPER_DIR -0.108 0.250 -0.041 0.056 -0.175 -0.178 -0.121 -0.004 -0.407 -0.214 -0.196 -0.120 -0.006 1.000
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4.3  The Dividend-ownership relation results 
Firstly, we run the empirical model (1) with pooled OLS, fixed effects and random effects. 
In the analysis, to identify the most suitable model, we performed two statistic tests: Breusch-
Pagan Lagrange multiplier (LM) and the Hausman tests. We performed the Breusch-Pagan 
Lagrange multiplier (Breusch & Pagan, 1980), which helps to choose between Pooled OLS 
and random effects models. The test result rejected the null hypothesis, validating the 
random effects model. Then, in order to select the most suitable model between the fixed 
effects and random effects models, we performed the Hausman (1978) test. The results of 
the regression showed a p-value higher than 0.05, therefore we did not reject the null 
hypothesis. The p-value of Hausman statistics suggested that the random effects method is 
more appropriate for the empirical model (1). Nonetheless, we suspected of 
heteroskedasticity problems in the estimations. To solve this problem, we used OLS with 
GLS cross-section weights to estimate the model. Thus, we will focus on the results of the 
random effects model and the Pooled OLS results. 
Table 4 reports the Pooled OLS, fixed effects and random effects panel estimation results of 
the empirical model (1) based on a full sample of 248 firm-year observations.  
In the Pooled OLS estimation, the R-square value is equal to 53.15%, which indicates that 
53% of the variance regarding the dividend ratio is explained by the independent variables. 
In addition, the global significance test suggests reliability and accuracy of the independent 
variables to explain the dependent variable. The R-squared of the random effects model is 
equal to 27.96%, lower than the one under the Pooled OLS estimation. On the basis of the 
F-statistic, the global significance of both models is strongly statistically significant (p-value 
<0.01). Comparing between models, we obtain a higher R-squared in the Pooled OLS in 
comparison with the random effects model. Therefore, the first model is preferred. 
According to the Pooled OLS estimation, the regression coefficient of managerial ownership 
is negative, and the regression coefficient of the squared managerial ownership is positive. 
The results support a U-shaped relationship between dividends and managerial ownership. 
Therefore, the managerial ownership variable (MAN) and the square managerial ownership 
(MAN2) are signed as expected. The results are consistent with the expected U-shaped 
relationship between dividend and the level of managerial ownership as predicted in our 
Hypothesis H1 and H2. The estimation reveals that both the managerial ownership and the 
squared managerial ownership terms are statistically significant. 
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TABLE 6 - REGRESSION RESULTS OF THE IMPACT OF OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE, 
DEBT FINANCING AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ON DIVIDEND POLICY FOR ALL 
FIRMS 
 
Notes: This table reports the Pooled OLS, fixed, random effects panel model estimation, and the output 
estimations of Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) and Hausman tests. The model sets the relationship 
between dividend policy, ownership structure and debt financing for a sample of 25 non-financial Portuguese 
companies over the 2007-2016 period. Dependent variable is DIV, defined as the ratio of total dividends to 
total assets. Definitions of all variables are reported in Table 1. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical 
significance is represented by * at 10% level, ** at 5% level and *** at 1% level.  
VARIABLE
Expected 
Sign
Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects
-0,0027 0,0208 ** 0,0092
(-0,400910) (2,107981) (0,654172)
( - ) -0,0278 *** 0,0230 -0,0315
(-2,625887) (1,354600) (-1,254336)
( + ) 0,0286 ** -0,0270 0,0233
(1,937569) (-1,255621) (0,691586)
( - ) -0,0334 *** -0,0531 *** -0,0515 ***
(-5,515254) (-5,927716) (-4,668718)
( + ) 0,0246 ** 0,0320 *** 0,0342 ***
(2,294684) (3,870029) (3,888201)
-0,0012 ** -0,0011 ** -0,0024 **
(-2,315792) (-1,976363) (-2,33728)
( - ) -0,0227 -0,0174 -0,0017
(-0,982069) (-0,941408) (-0,040853)
( + ) 0,0441 *** 0,0084 0,0320 *
(5,191899) (0,66485) (1,707375)
( + ) 0,0234 *** 0,0209 *** 0,0260 ***
(7,704931) (6,734763) (5,840683)
0,0069 *** 0,0084 ** 0,0112 **
(2,800576) (2,214358) (2,055875)
( - ) -0,0094 ** -0,0074 -0,0127
(-1,944517) (-1,209947) (-1,294604)
( - ) 0,0119 ** 0,0015 0,0136
(2,328478) (0,257073) (1,365517)
0,0099 * -0,0006 0,0143
(1,838626) (-0,105377) (1,204653)
0,0008 -0,0075 -0,0066
(0,108312) (-0,798992) (-0,442766)
0,0000 0,0068 0,0062
(-0,010751) (1,430996) (0,844196)
( + ) 0,0059 *** -0,0037 0,0022
(3,463821) (-1,227864) (0,563759)
R-squared 53,15% 71,67% 27,96%
Adjusted R-squared 50,12% 66,36% 23,30%
Obs. 248 248 248
F-statistic 17,5452 *** 13,4944 *** 6,0035 ***
LM test 19,4298 ***
Hausman test 22,4802
OLD DIR
WOMEN DIR
EXPER DIR
CHAIRCEO
CAPEX
CASH
TOBIN Q
BOARDSIZE
INDEP DIR
NONEXE DIR
FIRM SIZE
INTERCEPT
MAN
MAN2
LEV
ROA
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Another important result is that, while in Pooled OLS the coefficients managerial ownership 
and the squared managerial ownership are statistically significant, in the random effects 
model they are not statically significant at any level (1%, 5% or 10%). Nonetheless, the results 
show the negative relationship of managerial ownership with dividends and the positive 
relationship with the square managerial ownership, as in the Pooled OLS model. 
Furthermore, given the results, it is possible to estimate a critical entrenchment level for 
managerial ownership which is approximately 49%. This means that, controlling for other 
factors, we find evidence that after a critical entrenchment level of managerial ownership of 
49%, the coefficient on managerial ownership changes from negative to positive.  
Among control variables, LEV is found to be statistically significant at 1% level in Pooled 
OLS and random effects models. The results support a negative statistically significant 
relationship between the level of debt and dividend payments, as expected. 
The variable ROA reveals a statistically significant positive relationship with dividends at a 
significance level of 0.05. This result supports that profitability is considered an important 
factor in influencing dividend payments and that a highly profitable firm is more likely to pay 
dividends. In fact, profitable firms are able to accumulate more earnings over time and, 
therefore, may be capable of paying higher dividends to their shareholders. This result 
confirm our hypothesis of a positive relationship between firm profitability and dividend 
payments, and is consistent with prior empirical studies (Jensen et al., 1992). 
The variable FIRM_SIZE is statically significant at 5% level for both models. The results 
show that the relation between firm size and dividend payments is negative. This result 
contradicts the view of Smith and Watts (1992) about the weak relationship between firm 
size and dividend policy. 
With respect to CAPEX, the relation between capital expenditures is in line with our 
expectations, showing a negative regression coefficient. With this in mind, it is clear that high 
capital expenditures have a negative impact on dividend payments. 
CASH holdings turn out to be statically significant at 1% level (in Pooled OLS model), 
validating a significant positive relation between cash holdings and distribution of dividends. 
The result confirmed our expectations and is in accordance with the view of Jensen (1986) 
about the firm’s free cash-flow. Therefore, with higher cash holdings, higher is the 
probability to make dividend distributions to shareholders. 
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In addition, TOBIN Q is found to be statistically significant at 1% level for both the Pooled 
OLS and random effects model. The results support a significant and positive relation 
between Tobin Q and dividends, as expected. 
Regarding the corporate governance variables, the variable board size proves to be 
statistically significant at 1% level. Our findings show a positive and significant relationship 
between board size and dividend payments, supporting our hypothesis H5. The increase in 
the number of board size reduces agency costs for monitoring managers and can be 
perceived as a positive decision that affects the firms’ dividend policy. As suggested in La 
Porta et al. (2000), large boards provide higher protection of shareholders’ interests and 
increase dividend payouts.  
The independent directors variable (INDEP_DIR) shows a significant (at 5% level) and 
negative effect on dividend payments in Portugal. This means that firms with a higher 
percentage of external board members in the Board of Directors may pursue low-dividend 
policies. These results are in line with hypothesis H6. 
With respect to the percentage of non-executive directors in the Board (NONEXE_DIR), 
we observe a statically significant at 5% level in the Pooled OLS model, whereas in the 
random effects model this variable is not statically significant. Against our expectations, the 
results show a positive relation between the percentage of non-executive directors on a Board 
and dividend distribution. This means that the presence of non-executive directors in the 
Board of Directors has a positive effect on dividend payments to shareholders.  
The variable OLD_DIR show a positive and significant (at 10% level) relation between 
dividend payments and the presence of directors with more than 65 years old in the Board 
of Directors. In addition, the variables WOMEN_DIR and EXPER_DIR are not statistically 
significant according to Pooled OLS and random effects models. 
Finally, the dummy variable CHAIRCEO is found to have a positive and significant impact 
on dividends. This result support our hypothesis H7. This means that in Portugal firms where 
the CEO is also the Chairman of the Board, pay more dividends to shareholders. This result 
can be explained by the fact that combining positions as Chairman of the Board and CEO 
cannot be considered as an effective tool to mitigate agency costs. Therefore, to solve free 
cash flow problems, shareholders claim higher dividend payments.  
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4.4  High-leverage firms results 
In a next phase, the objective was to divide the sample of 25 Portuguese non-financial listed 
firms in two different subsamples, namely the low-leverage firms and the high-leverage firms. 
To create the subsamples, we selected companies based on the average values of leverage in 
the period between 2007-2016. The group of high-leverage firms was composed by 12 
companies, which corresponds to a number of 118 firm-year observations. 
As previously, we estimated both fixed and random effects specifications of the model and 
Pooled OLS. In addition, the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier (LM) and the Hausman 
tests were conducted to determine the appropriate model. We report the results of the tests 
performed on this subsample in Table 7.  
First, we performed the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier (LM) test. The result showed a 
p-value superior to 0.05, which means that the Pooled OLS model is preferred over the 
random effects model. The Hausman specification test suggested the non-rejection of the 
null hypothesis, indicating that the random effect model is appropriate. Based on the results, 
we consider the Pooled OLS model as the preferred model.  
Similarly to the empirical model (1), the results from the model (2) suggest a negative 
relationship between dividends and managerial ownership and a positive relationship 
between dividends and the squared managerial ownership, supporting the U-shaped 
relationship predicted in the hypotheses H1 and H2. Additionally, according to our model 
results, the critical entrenchment level for high-leverage firms is approximately 42%. 
In addition, a curious result is that in the case of high-leverage firms, we found that the 
variables managerial ownership and the squared managerial ownership are not statically 
significant. That result possibly emerges from the fact that entrenched managers, due to firm 
leverage, fail to pay more dividends at high levels of ownership, as stated in the 
“entrenchment irrelevance hypothesis”. Based on the results, we can suppose that high 
leverage exercises a negative effect upon agency costs, which are consequently mitigated, 
mainly through monitoring by capital markets (Easterbrook, 1984; Rozeff, 1982). This result 
is also consistent with Jensen (1986) view that leverage reduces agency costs, since there is 
control over managers actions in the use of free cash flow for personal benefits. These results 
are consistent with previous studies and is in accordance to hypothesis H4.  
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With respect to control variables, LEV, CASH and TOBIN Q are equally statistically 
significant at 1% level and the relationship between those variables and dividend payments 
did not change when compared to the sample of 25 firms. 
In particular, the variable ROA turned out to be only statically significant at 10% level and 
the relationship changed. The regression coefficient for this variable in the group of high-
leverage firms turned out to be negative. 
With respect to FIRM_SIZE for the group of high-leverage firms, we find that the variable 
is not statistically significant and, comparing with the sample of all firms, the relationship 
between dividend payments and firm size did not change. 
Regarding corporate governance variables, some of them change their significance 
comparing the group of high-leverage firms versus the sample with all firms. For high-
leverage firms BOARDSIZE and INDEP_DIR are not statistically significant. According to 
these results, there are no significant relationship between dividends and board size, 
contradicting the Hypothesis H5. In addition, the INDEP_DIR variable show a positive 
relationship between dividends and the percentage of independent directors on the Board, 
contradicting the hypotheses H6. 
For the variable CHAIRCEO, the results are similar to the ones obtained from the sample 
of all firms. We observe a positive statically significant (now at 5% level versus 1% level in 
the sample with all firms) relation between CEO duality and dividend payments. This result 
support the Hypothesis H7. 
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TABLE 7 - REGRESSION RESULTS FOR HIGH-LEVERAGE FIRMS 
 
Notes: This table reports the Pooled OLS, fixed, random effects panel model estimation for high-leverage 
firms and the output estimations of Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) and Hausman tests. The model 
sets the relationship between dividend policy, ownership structure and debt financing for a sample of 12 non-
financial Portuguese companies over the 2007-2016 period. Dependent variable is DIV, defined as the ratio of 
total dividends to total assets. Definitions of all variables are reported in Table 1. t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. Statistical significance is represented by * at 10% level, ** at 5% level and *** at 1% level.  
 
 
 
 
 
VARIABLE
Expected 
Sign
Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects
0,0340 ** 0,0172 -0,0107
2,351202 0,936058 -0,487381
( - ) -0,0255 0,0309 -0,0267
-1,55085 1,246595 -0,928495
( + ) 0,0305 -0,0467 0,0380
1,007215 -1,162647 0,765394
( - ) -0,0619 *** -0,0341 * -0,0242
-4,363807 -1,822851 -1,101089
( + ) -0,0366 * -0,0323 -0,0135
-1,852975 -1,338768 -0,331463
-0,0004 -0,0004 -0,0018 *
-0,767787 -0,607092 -1,626702
( + ) 0,0555 *** 0,0360 0,0505 ***
6,513824 1,408127 3,63632
( + ) 0,0181 *** 0,0166 *** 0,0257 ***
4,698655 3,110742 6,614104
0,0017 0,0044 0,0073
0,593289 1,022051 1,352621
( - ) 0,0015 -0,0040 0,0058
0,290824 -0,626551 0,60312
( - ) 0,0107 *** 0,0009 0,0117
3,077932 0,127951 1,379891
( + ) 0,0041 ** -0,0034 0,0039
2,341044 -0,995334 1,142992
R-squared 72,58% 78,20% 54,26%
Adjusted R-squared 69,73% 73,15% 49,52%
Obs. 118 118 118
F-statistic 25,5060 *** 15,4912 *** 11,4336 ***
LM test 2,9931 *
Hausman test 17,4901 *
INTERCEPT
MAN
MAN2
CASH
TOBIN Q
LEV
ROA
FIRM SIZE
CHAIRCEO
BOARDSIZE
INDEP DIR
NONEXE DIR
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4.5  Low-leverage firms results 
The second group is composed by 12 companies with lower levels of leverage also in the 
period between 2007-2016. Table 8 reports the estimation results of the regressions with 
Pooled OLS, Fixed effects and Random effects model for a number of 120 firm-year 
observations. 
According to the Hausman test, the fixed effects model is preferred. However, the Breusch-
Pagan Lagrange multiplier (LM) test confirmed that Pooled OLS is the appropriate model. 
In addition, the results from the Pooled OLS are in line with the estimation results obtained 
for the sample that includes all firms. 
The results from the model (2) suggest a negative relationship between dividends and 
managerial ownership and a positive relationship between dividends and the squared 
managerial ownership, in accordance with the hypotheses H1 and H2. Additionally, based 
on the model results, the critical entrenchment level for low-leverage firms is approximately 
65%, while in high-leverage firms is approximately 42%. The result suggests that in high-
leverage firms the alignment effect is smaller than in low-leverage firms. Because of leverage, 
after a critical level of managerial ownership of 42%, companies consider necessary to 
compensate potential managerial entrenchment paying more dividends to shareholders. In 
the case of low-leverage this critical level rises to 65%, suggesting that before the critical level 
dividends are less needed for monitoring purposes. 
The results with Pooled OLS model reveal that for Portuguese low-leverage firms the 
relationship between dividends and managerial ownership is statically significant at 5% level 
(versus 1% level when compared to the sample with 25 firms), whereas the squared of 
managerial ownership is not significant. The results contradict hypothesis H3.  
Regarding control variables, LEV, CASH and TOBIN Q are equally statistically significant 
at 5%, 1% and 1% level respectively. The relationship between those variables and dividend 
payments did not change when compared to the sample of 25 firms and the group of high-
leverage firms. 
For the group of low-leverage debt, the variable ROA turned out to be statically significant 
at 1% level and the relationship with dividends is positive, as it is in the sample with all firms.  
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With respect to FIRM_SIZE, for the group of low-leverage firms, the variable is not 
statistically significant and the relationship between dividend payments and firm size did not 
change when compared to the sample of all firms and the group of high-leverage firms. 
Regarding corporate governance variables, we found that for low-leverage firms 
BOARDSIZE is not statistically significant. We find no statistically significant relation 
between dividends and board size, contradicting the Hypothesis H5. Furthermore, for this 
specific group we found a negative relationship between board size and dividend payments 
for low-leverage Portuguese companies. 
In addition, the INDEP_DIR variable show a negative statically significance (at 1% level) 
relationship between dividends and the percentage of independent directors on the Board, 
in accordance with the hypotheses H6.  
Similarly to the results for all firms, the variable NONEXE_DIR show a positive statically 
significance (at 1% level) relationship between dividends and the percentage of non-
executive directors on the Board. 
For the variable CHAIRCEO, the results are also similar to the ones obtained from the 
sample of all firms and high-leverage firms. We observe a positive statically significant (now 
at 5% level versus 1% level in the sample with all firms) relation between CEO duality and 
dividend payments. This result support the Hypothesis H7. 
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TABLE 8 - REGRESSION RESULTS FOR LOW-LEVERAGE FIRMS 
 
Notes: This table reports the Pooled OLS, fixed, random effects panel model estimation for low-leverage firms 
and the output estimations of Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) and Hausman tests. The model sets the 
relationship between dividend policy, ownership structure and debt financing for a sample of 12 non-financial 
Portuguese companies over the 2007-2016 period. Dependent variable is DIV, defined as the ratio of total 
dividends to total assets. Definitions of all variables are reported in Table 1. t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. Statistical significance is represented by * at 10% level, ** at 5% level and *** at 1% level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
VARIABLE
Expected 
Sign
Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects
0,0106 0,0067 0,0179
0,777704 0,347708 1,012948
( - ) -0,0430 ** 0,1025 -0,0408
-1,966129 1,594479 -1,199007
( + ) 0,0328 -0,0984 * 0,0165
1,137222 -1,644256 0,357192
( - ) -0,0301 ** -0,0661 *** -0,0493 ***
-2,313852 -5,749384 -2,900796
( + ) 0,0295 *** 0,0429 *** 0,0378 ***
2,667663 5,196319 3,309505
-0,0008 -0,0012 -0,0021
-0,680374 -1,569313 -1,346766
( + ) 0,0731 *** 0,0638 ** 0,0985 ***
3,159467 2,228153 2,735433
( + ) 0,0186 *** 0,0223 *** 0,0228 ***
3,731905 5,875095 3,066481
-0,0047 0,0081 0,0009
-1,098243 1,058082 0,142831
( - ) -0,0381 *** -0,0123 -0,0459 ***
-3,746622 -0,763146 -3,253338
( - ) 0,0541 *** 0,0103 0,0591 ***
4,349353 0,909939 3,389182
( + ) 0,0087 ** -0,0036 0,0048
2,22891 -0,797885 0,820882
R-squared 47,36% 74,89% 39,95%
Adjusted R-squared 42,00% 69,20% 33,84%
Obs. 120 120 120
F-statistic 8,8322 *** 13,1526 *** 6,5330 ***
LM test 2,4512
Hausman test 35,9452 ***
INTERCEPT
MAN
MAN2
CASH
TOBIN Q
LEV
ROA
FIRM SIZE
CHAIRCEO
BOARDSIZE
INDEP DIR
NONEXE DIR
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Conclusion  
This study examined the relationship between dividend policy, managerial ownership and 
debt-financing based on a sample of 25 firms listed on Euronext Lisbon from 2007 to 2016, 
using a panel data estimation methodology. This analysis is crucial to better understand 
whether dividends, managerial ownership and debt financing are substitute mechanisms in 
reducing agency costs. 
We investigated the impact of several control variables, such as Leverage, Return on Assets, 
Firm size, CAPEX, Cash holdings and Tobin’s Q on Dividend payments. In addition, we 
also investigated the impact of some corporate governance variables on dividend policy, 
namely the board size, the percentage of independent directors, non-executive directors, 
women directors, old directors and experienced directors on the Board of Directors of non-
financial Portuguese listed companies. We also included a dummy variable to test for CEO 
duality significance and infer the existing relationship with dividend payments. 
The U-shaped relationship between dividends and managerial ownership is confirmed in our 
results. As Jensen and Meckling (1976) support, when managers hold a small portion of 
equity and shareholders are too dispersed to take monitoring action, managers make 
corporate decisions in order to obtain personal benefits. However, as managerial ownership 
increases, managers will support higher agency costs. As managerial ownership increases, 
managers will hold a percentage of shares to obtain enough voting power and there is a point 
at which managers secure their position enough to become protected from external 
disciplinary forces (Demsetz, 1983; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Farinha, 2003b). This is called the 
entrenchment hypothesis and it has important implications for the dividend–ownership 
relation, supported by a U-shaped relationship. In short, below a certain ownership level, 
dividends and ownership are substitute mechanisms and thus, they are negatively related. 
Nevertheless, this negative relation may become positive due to the fact that managers with 
significant managerial ownership might be too entrenched, increasing the probability to pay 
higher portion of dividends (Farinha, 2003b; Florackis et al., 2015; Schooley & Barney, 1994). 
In particular, for Portuguese listed companies the coefficient on managerial ownership 
changes from negative to positive at a critical entrenchment level of approximately 49%. This 
critical level is clearly superior to the critical entrenchment level estimated by Farinha (2003b) 
of 30%. We find a U-shaped relationship between managerial ownership and dividends, 
which is consistent the entrenchment effect of managerial ownership (Farinha, 2003b; 
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Schooley & Barney, 1994). Therefore, our findings seem to be explained in the view of 
agency theory. 
To compare the results and test whether leverage plays an important role in mitigating agency 
problems, we also examined if the impact of managerial ownership on dividends differed 
across firms with different levels of leverage.  
With respect to the relationship between dividends and managerial ownership for high and 
low leverage firms the results lead to several interesting conclusions. We find that in fact the 
relationship between managerial ownership and dividends is slightly different in high-
leverage and low-leverage firms. While for firms with high level of debt, we observed that 
dividends and managerial ownership are substitute mechanisms to reduce agency costs, for 
firms with low level of debt, there is a lack of disciplinary mechanisms for controlling agency 
costs, increasing the probability of entrenchment problems at higher levels of managerial 
ownership. The results are consistent with Agrawal and Jayaraman (1994) with respect to 
find a more pronounced negative relationship between managerial ownership and dividends 
in low-leverage firms, since they have greater free cash flow and do not use debt as a 
disciplinary mechanism for controlling agency costs.  
For the sample of 25 firms Portuguese listed companies, we find a statically significant impact 
of leverage, Return on Assets, firm size, cash holdings and Tobin Q on dividend distribution 
to shareholders. In contrast, we conclude that capital expenditures do not have a significant 
impact on dividend policy of Portuguese firms. 
Our results also provide strong evidence of the significant role of corporate ownership 
structure and board characteristics in explaining the behaviour of dividend policy in 
Portuguese firms. We find a significant impact of Board size, the percentage of independent 
directors, non-executive directors and old directors in the Board of Directors on the 
Dividend Policy of Portuguese companies. On the other hand, the presence of women and 
experienced directors on the Board of Directors do not have a significant impact on dividend 
policy decisions in Portuguese companies. 
Concerning the CEO duality, we show that in Portugal, non-financial listed firms with CEO 
being also the Chairman of the Board of Directors have a positive and significant impact on 
Dividend Policy. This means that firms with CEO duality pay higher level of dividends. 
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All in all, in the absence of other corporate mechanisms, dividend policy is likely to have an 
important role in monitoring management and mitigating agency costs, especially in the case 
of Portuguese firms, which are mainly characterized by high managerial ownership and low 
dispersed capital. 
 
Limitations 
This study presents some limitations. One of the most important limitation of this 
dissertation is the sample size. Due to the fact that there is a small number of listed 
companies in Portugal that pay dividends, we have a reduced number of observations, which 
could affect the statistical inference and consequentially the results from the analysis. In 
addition, an important limitation of the analysis of the impact of managerial ownership 
structure and corporate governance on dividend policy is the availability of data. There was 
no available database with corporate governance data for the Portuguese companies, 
demanding a very exhaustive work to gather all the necessary information for all the firms 
along the period from 2007 to 2016. 
 
Further Research 
This topic should be a subject for further investigation in the future. A possible line of 
investigation is to focus, not only on linear, but also on non-linear relationships between 
dividends, ownership structure and debt financing, using non-parametric methodologies as 
suggested by Florackis et al. (2015). In addition, it would be interesting to test a model with 
a cubed managerial ownership variable as performed in Farinha and López-de-Foronda 
(2009) to investigate the relationship between dividend policy and the level of managerial 
ownership in Portuguese firms. According to the authors, it is possible to obtain two 
inflection points, where there is a change in the behaviour of insider shareholders with 
respect to Dividend Policy decisions within the firm. 
As future work it would be interesting to deepen this study with a larger sample of firms 
applying alternative dividend policy measures (the probability of paying dividends, dividend 
payout ratio and dividend yield) and using other regression techniques to test the research 
hypotheses. 
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In addition, a possible development of this work is to study for the Portuguese listed 
companies the impact of managerial ownership, corporate governance and debt financing 
on dividends payments, particularly in the period before, during and after the financial crisis. 
Further research might usefully extend the present use of dividend models to examine the 
impact of managerial ownership, corporate governance and debt financing not only in 
Portugal, but also in other markets. 
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Annexes 
 
Annex 1: Sample from Euronext Lisbon  
  Company Industry Sector 
1 ALTRI SGPS Industrials Industrial Goods & Services 
2 COFINA,SGPS Consumer Services Publishing 
3 CORTICEIRA AMORIM Consumer Goods Food & Beverage 
4 CTT CORREIOS PORT Industrials Industrial Goods & Services 
5 EDP Utilities Conventional Electricity 
6 EDP RENOVAVEIS Utilities Alternative Electricity 
7 F.RAMA Basic Materials Industrial Metals & Mining 
8 GALP ENERGIA-NOM Oil & Gas Oil & Gas Producers 
9 IBERSOL,SGPS Consumer Services Restaurants & Bars 
10 J.MARTINS,SGPS Consumer Services Food Retailers & Wholesalers 
11 MEDIA CAPITAL Consumer Services Broadcasting & Entertainment 
12 MOTA ENGIL Industrials Heavy Construction 
13 NOS, SGPS Consumer Services Broadcasting & Entertainment 
14 NOVABASE,SGPS Technology Computer Services 
15 OREY ANTUNES ESC. Industrials Marine Transportation 
16 PHAROL Telecommunications Fixed Line Telecommunications 
17 REN Utilities Conventional Electricity 
18 SEMAPA Basic Materials Paper 
19 SONAE Consumer Services Food Retailers & Wholesalers 
20 SONAE CAPITAL Financials Specialty Finance 
21 SONAECOM,SGPS Telecommunications Mobile Telecommunications 
22 SUMOL+COMPAL Consumer Goods Beverages 
23 TEIXEIRA DUARTE Industrials Heavy Construction 
24 THE NAVIGATOR COMP Basic Materials Paper 
25 TOYOTA CAETANO Industrials Commercial Vehicles & Trucks 
 
Source: https://www.bolsadelisboa.com.pt/cotacoes/accoes-lisboa 
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Annex 2: Graph with number of companies by industry type 
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